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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the landmark "right-to-die" case, In re Quinlan,' society has
endeavored to resolve the intricate and profound issues raised by the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment.' One
* Member, St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
For an extensive and authoritative study addressing the issues raised in deciding to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DE-
CIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
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prominent issue, now frequently addressed, relates to the propriety of
withholding or withdrawing "artificial nutrition and hydration"' from ter-
minally ill4 and "permanently unconscious' '5 patients.6 In the absence of
SION]. The President's Commission was established by Congress in 1978, and consisted of
ethicists, lawyers, doctors, theologians, scientists, and others. See 42 U.S.C. § 300v (1982).
For a short selection of scholarly materials on the right to die and related issues, see Note,
Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REV.
689, 691 n.8 (1987).
' The phrase "artificial nutrition and hydration," or simply, "artificial feeding" or "artificial
nourishment," refers to the tubal provision of food and water to the patient by various
means including: intravenous tube (through veins of the limbs); hyperalimentation (through
a major vein in the chest); nasogastric tube (through nose and esophagus into stomach); and
gastrostomy tube (through abdominal wall directly into stomach). See In re Hier, 18 Mass.
App. Ct. 200, 203-05, 464 N.E.2d 959, 961-62, review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261
(1984); SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION 6 (1987). See
generally Major, The Medical Procedures for Providing Food and Water: Indications and
Effects, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 21-28 (J. Lynn ed. 1986) (summarizing artificial
feeding techniques and discussing some benefits and drawbacks).
' See Bayer, Perspectives from Catholic Theology, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 89, 92
(J. Lynn ed. 1986). Father Bayer stated:
[Tihe phrase "terminally ill" is, as many Catholic moralists warn, dangerously vague.
What it should really mean is "the last phases of terminal illness." In other words,
the illness must be of such a nature that, no matter what one does medically ... the
person is going to die within a rather short time.
Id.; see UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 1(9) (Proposed Official Draft by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1985). The proposed Act
defines "terminal condition" as a condition which, without life-sustaining treatment, will
"result in death within a relatively short time." Id.; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342,
486 A.2d 1209, 1219 (1985) (death within approximately one year even with treatment); In
re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 478, 517 A.2d 886, 888 (Ch. Div.) (patient may survive
several years with treatment, but probably only a few weeks without), aft'd, 213 N.J. Super.
443, 517 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986); Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of
Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 547-48 (1985) (death need not be immi-
nent-Conroy court recognized that patient's right of bodily integrity is "as applicable six
months before the moment of death as six minutes before"). The definition proposed by the
President's Commission is somewhat unique. The Commission, declining to use "ironclad
categories" to describe particular patients, asserted that "terminally ill" was to be used as
merely a "descriptive term" which would reflect a patient-based assessment and refer to
patients "whose illness is likely to cause death within what is to that person a very short
time." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 26.
' This Article will use the term "permanently unconscious," as did the President's Commis-
sion, to refer generally to patients in either a deep coma or persistent vegetative state. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 174 n.9. The term denotes those patients "in
whom all possible components of mental life are absent-all thought, feeling, sensation, de-
sire, emotion, and awareness of self or environment." Id. at 174. See generally id. at 170-81
(discussing type of patients who fall within term "permanently unconscious").
SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 3, at 1.
The subject of withholding or withdrawing technologically supplied nutrition and
hydration . . . from terminally ill and permanently unconscious patients has moved
into the foreground of right-to-die issues during the '80s. According to an American
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specific legislation aimed at resolving this difficult issue, courts have at-
tempted to define the contours of the patient's prerogative in particular
adjudications.7 Formulation of public policy aimed at resolving the legal,
moral, and ethical dilemmas raised by life-sustaining medical treatment
decisions necessitates the concerted scrutiny most aptly provided by the
legislative branch in order to clarify the rights and duties of patients,
their families, health care professionals, and health care institutions.8
Traditionally, the pastoral authorities of the Catholic Church and Catho-
lic theologians have attempted to delineate the parameters of morally ac-
ceptable medical practice.9 Church teaching, however, has not definitively
resolved the question of the propriety of withholding or withdrawing arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration from terminally ill and permanently uncon-
scious patients.'0 Clarification of the Church's position would alleviate the
quandary presently troubling health care providers and decision-makers
within the Catholic community and, simultaneously, would provide the
law-making bodies ultimately responsible for defining the rights and obli-
Medical Association estimate, on any given day in the United States there are ap-
proximately 10,000 individuals ... in .. . permanently unconscious conditions who
are maintained by tubal feedings.
Id.
" See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 345, 486 A.2d at 1221 (court may not avoid issue simply
because it is troublesome or difficult). The Conroy court noted, however, that the legislature
would be the best body for formulating "clear standards for resolving requests to terminate
life-sustaining treatment." Id. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220.
' Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980). In Perlmutter, the Florida Supreme
Court commented:
Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with complexity and encom-
passes the interests of the law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social mo-
rality, it is not one which is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial pro-
ceeding. It is ... [an] issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum,
where fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institu-
tions and disciplines can be presented and synthesized.
Id.
The concerted effort required to scrutinize and weigh relevant personal and societal
interests in an effort to formulate acceptable policies to guide decisions concerning life-sus-
taining medical treatment is exemplified by the work of the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law. After a detailed study, the Task Force, composed of doctors, ethicists,
lawyers, and others, reported to the Governor that legislation was necessary to guide the
issuance of do-not-resuscitate-orders ("DNR"). See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE
AND THE LAW, Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS 18 (1986). In its report to the Governor, the
Task Force proposed legislation, see id. at 76, which the legislature largely incorporated into
a statute passed in 1987. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2978 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
9 See infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
10 See The Long Island Catholic, Jan. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (quoting statement by Monsignor
Orville Griese of the Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center,
Braintree, Mass., that issue was "an open question"); infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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gations of citizens with persuasive and instructive guidance."
This Article will discuss the background of the legally recognized
right to refuse medical treatment, and will focus on the considerations
involved in determining the propriety of withholding or withdrawing arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration from terminally ill and permanently uncon-
scious patients. Recent New Jersey cases, defining the contours of the pa-
tient's prerogative regarding artificial nutrition and hydration, and recent
New York cases, which illustrate the developments in a jurisdiction cur-
rently addressing this issue, will be examined. In addition, this Article
will discuss contemporary Catholic moral theology pertaining to the
subject.
II. SOME RECENT CASE LAW ON WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING
ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
A. Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The right of competent adults (as well as incompetent adults whose
rights may be exercised through surrogate decision-makers) to refuse
medical treatment has its genesis primarily in two sources: the common-
law right of self-determination and bodily integrity, 2 presently embodied
in the doctrine of informed consent," and the right of privacy protected
by either the state or federal Constitutions. 4
" See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
12 See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, stated that "[elvery human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." Id. at 129, 105
N.E. at 93.
" See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily In-
tegrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973). The doctrine of
informed consent provides that "no medical procedure may be performed without a pa-
tient's consent, obtained after explanation of the nature of the treatment, substantial risks,
and alternative therapies." Id. The doctrine logically encompasses not only the right to con-
sent to treatment, but also the right to refuse treatment. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (1983); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486
A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 App. Div. 2d 1, 14,
516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 686 (2d Dep't 1987); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83
YALE L.J. 1632, 1648 (1974). In New York, legislation and administrative rules and regula-
tions give recognition to the patient's rudimentary rights in governing the course of his or
her medical treatment. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2504, 2803-c(3)(e), 2805-d(I) (McKin-
ney 1985); [1985] 10 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 405.25(a)(7), 414.14. Moreover, the New York legislature,
in recognizing the patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, passed a stat-
ute to govern the legal implementation of orders-not-to resuscitate ("DNR"). See N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2978 (McKinney Supp. 1988). A DNR order, placed on a patient's
medical chart, directs the withholding of cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") should the
patient suffer cardiac or respiratory arrest. Id. §§ 2961(13), 2962(2).
" See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Quin-
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Regardless of the source of the asserted right to refuse medical treat-
ment, courts have generally recognized that the right is not absolute, but
rather, may be limited by four potentially countervailing state interests.
These interests are the preservation of life, prevention of suicide, mainte-
nance of the integrity of the medical profession, and protection of inno-
cent third parties.1 5 When a patient asserts his or her right to decline life-
sustaining medical treatment, each of the foregoing state interests should
be balanced against that right based on the particular facts and
circumstances."6
B. The New Jersey Supreme Court on Withholding or Withdrawing
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
Presently, an issue of particular significance is the propriety of ex-
tending a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment such
that it encompasses the right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration.
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Peter," was faced with
setting guidelines and procedures under which a life-sustaining artificial
Ian, the New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on both the New Jersey and federal constitu-
tions, recognized that a patient's right of privacy is presumably "broad enough to encom-
pass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." Id. at
40, 355 A.2d at 663; accord Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 301 (1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986). Some courts, however, have avoided the consti-
tutional issue by determining that in the context of the decision at hand the common-law
right of self-determination adequately embraced the patient's asserted right. See Conroy, 98
N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). While one commentator has argued
that grounding the patient's prerogative to forego medical treatment in the common law
rather than the constitutional right of privacy is advantageous to the patient, see Cantor,
supra note 4, at 547 (when grounded in common law, uncertain strictures of constitutional
tort law are avoided and state action need not be established), another has argued that it is
the constitutional right of privacy which is more favorable to patients. See Note, In re
Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (1982)
(courts more adamantly protect constitutional rights when balanced against state interests
and only constitutional right of privacy allows concurrent right of substituted judgment).
," See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223; accord Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz.
207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195 &
n.6, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 & n.6 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 23,
516 N.Y.S.2d at 691; In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 556, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (1987). See
generally Note, The Refusal of Life-Saving Medical Treatment vs. the State's Interest in
the Preservation of Life: A Clarification of the Interests at Stake, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 101-
10 (1980) (analysis of potentially countervailing state interests).
IS See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348-49, 529 A.2d 404, 411-13 (1987).
17 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
32 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 1
feeding tube-a nasogastric tube-could be removed from a sixty-five-
year-old nursing home patient; this patient was in a persistent vegetative
state and, although she had no hope of recovery, was capable of surviving
with the life-sustaining treatment for an indeterminate time."8 To guide
its determination, the New Jersey court looked to its prior decisions in
the seminal cases of In re Quinlan9 and In re Conroy." A comprehensive
analysis of these cases is beyond the purview of this Article, but a terse
explication of their salient aspects should be profitable.
In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the guardian and
family of a young adult patient, Karen Quinlan, who existed in a persis-
tent vegetative state, to effectuate Karen's right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment." The court required that these surrogate decision-
makers use their "best judgment" in deciding whether Karen would have
exercised her right through procedures the court established for removal
of the life-support apparatus-a respirator.2 2
In Conroy, the court addressed the issue of withholding or withdraw-
ing a nasogastric tube from an incompetent, elderly nursing home patient
with "severe and permanent mental and physical impairments" and a life
expectancy of less than one year.23 The Conroy court, rather than adopt-
S Id. at 370, 529 A.2d at 421-22. The patient, Hilda Peter, due to her incompetency, was
only able to assert her rights of self-determination and privacy through a surrogate decision-
maker. Id. at 370-71, 529 A.2d at 422. New Jersey recognizes that "[aill patients, competent
or incompetent, with some limited cognitive ability or in a persistent vegetative state, termi-
nally ill or not terminally ill, are entitled to choose whether or not they want life-sustaining
medical treatment." Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 423.
"9 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
20 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). For a brief selection of commentary on the Conroy
case, see By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 227-66 (J. Lynn ed. 1986) (collection of articles);
Cantor, supra note 4; Note, In re Conroy: A Limited Right to Withhold or Withdraw Artifi-
cial Nourishment, 6 PACE L. REV. 219 (1986); Note, supra note 2, at 715-29.
2 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
" Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. In order to remove the respirator without any participant
incurring civil or criminal liability, the court required the concurrence of the family, guard-
ian, and attending physician. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. In addition, the court mandated
that the attending physician must conclude that Karen would have no reasonable chance of
returning to a "cognitive, sapient state," and that after the physicians shall have consulted
with a hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body, that consultative body must concur in the
attending physician's prognosis. Id.
23 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216. Even though Ms. Conroy died with the nasogas-
tric tube in tact, while the case was pending an appeal from the trial court, the supreme
court, believing that the matter was of substantial importance and capable of repetition yet
evading review, nonetheless, rendered a decision on the merits. Id. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219.
The court insisted that patients like Ms. Conroy-formerly competent, institutionalized,
and elderly with less than one year to live-do not lose their right to determine the course
of their medical treatment because of subsequent incompetency, and considered it the goal
of a surrogate decision-maker to determine and effectuate, as far as possible, the decision
the patient would make if he or she was competent. See id. at 359-60, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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ing the guidelines and procedures established in Quinlan, limited Quin-
lan to the category of patients which it addressed-those in a persistent
vegetative state or comatose.2 The court, instead, pronounced three tests,
any one of which must be satisfied before a surrogate's decision to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent, nursing
home patient could be lawfully exercised.26
The first test, the "subjective test," is satisfied where it is "clear that
the particular patient would have refused the treatment under the cir-
cumstances involved. '26 Under Conroy's "subjective test," a surrogate de-
cision-maker must be sufficiently informed to reach a decision, in the
same manner that a competent patient must be informed to render an
informed consent or refusal.27 Perhaps the best evidence of the patient's
24 Id. at 358-59, 374-75, 486 A.2d at 1228, 1237.
" See id. at 360-68, 486 A.2d at 1229-33.
' Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229. This type of approach, commonly referred to as "substituted
judgment," attempts to effectuate the choice the incapacitated person would make if capa-
ble to choose. See id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at
132. One problem likely to be encountered by a surrogate decision-maker arises when such
decision-maker attempts to make a decision perceptibly adverse to the patient's best inter-
ests, but arguably the choice the patient would have made if capable. Compare N. CANTOR,
LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 67 (1987) (substituted judgment allows implementa-
tion of patient's aberrational wishes) and SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND
THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT 27 (1985) (implementation of patient's choice not necessarily
in patient's best interest, even if objectively irrational) with PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra
note 2, at 133 (at some level, decisions potentially adverse to patient's interests can only be
chosen directly by competent patient). The probative value of the evidence of the patient's
subjective intent prior to becoming incompetent depends upon the facts and circumstances
under which the patient expressed his treatment preferences, with consideration given to
such factors as the patient's maturity and the "remoteness, consistency and thoughtfulness
of the prior statements or actions." Conroy, 98 N.J. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230. See generally
N. CANTOR, supra, at 63-67 (discussing principles of substituted judgment, limits to its util-
ity, and problems encountered in its application). For a related view, compare Eichner v.
Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981),
where the New York Court of Appeals required "clear and convincing" proof of the previ-
ously expressed desires of a formerly competent, eighty-three year old patient not to be
maintained in a vegetative state on a respirator. See id. at 378-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 274. This view requires that the patient's specific desires be known and articu-
lated to the health care provider, and may be distinguished from the view that the family or
representative choose on behalf of the patient based upon inferences of his treatment pref-
erences under the facts and circumstances. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra, at 27.
Other New York cases requiring proof of the previously expressed desires of a formerly
competent patient include the following: Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129
App. Div. 2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987); In re Strauss, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1987, at
12, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County); In re O'Brien (Kerr), 135 Misc. 2d 1076, 517 N.Y.S.2d
346 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp. (Cinque), 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1982).
"" See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231. Relevant information would include the
patient's "level of physical, sensory, emotional, and cognitive functioning; . . . degree of
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subjective intent to forego certain types of life-sustaining medical proce-
dures is a signed, dated, and witnessed written document, known as a
"living will," under which a patient's prior directive authorizes the with-
holding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures in specified
circumstances.2 8 Other evidence may include oral directives to family or
humiliation, dependence and loss of dignity ... resulting from the condition and treatment;
the life expectancy and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; the various
treatment options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits." Id. at 363-64, 486 A.2d at 1231.
2' See In re Peter, 108 N.J. 370, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). For a list of the thirty-nine jurisdic-
tions-thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia-that have enacted laws referred to
as "living will" or "natural death" legislation, see In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 342 n.2, 529
A.2d 404, 407 n.2 (1987). See also P. WILLIAMS, LIVING WILL SOURCE BOOK WITH FORMS
(1986) (containing state natural death laws governing execution of living wills, state man-
dated living will forms, and generic form with instructions for effectuating execution of liv-
ing will in states without such legislation). Additionally, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws has approved and recommended model legislation
governing advanced directives by an adult in a "terminal condition" and incapable of partic-
ipating in decisions regarding life-sustaining medical treatment. See UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE
TERMINALLY ILL ACT (Proposed Official Draft by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, 1985). The proposed Act is not without criticism. See Statement of
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Committee for Pro-life Activities, in The
Rights of the Terminally Ill, 16 ORIGINS 222 (1986) [hereinafter U.S. Bishops' Committee
for Pro-Life Activities]; Marzen, "The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act": A Criti-
cal Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 441 (1986). The "Society for the Right to Die," a key
participant in shaping the substantive contours of right-to-die issues, serves as a source of
informative literature in this area, and offers individuals information, counseling, and assis-
tance in implementing or understanding living wills. They are located at 250 West 57th
Street, New York, N.Y. 10107.
New York does not presently have a statute governing living wills. See generally NEW
YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT. MAKING DECI-
SIONS AND APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT 76, 85 n.8 (1987) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]
(New York has no such legislation though five bills were introduced during 1986-1987 legis-
lative session); Note, To Die or Not to Die: The New York Legislature Ponders a Natural
Death Act, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (1985) (recommending that the New York legislature
adopt a living will statute). However, in the context of a declaratory judgment action, a New
York court deemed the petitioner's proposed living will to be something of an "informed
medical consent statement" and "evidence of the most persuasive quality and ... a clear
and convincing demonstration" of her desires while competent. See Saunders v. State, 129
Misc. 2d 45, 54, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 517 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1985). A living will may,
nevertheless, leave doubt as to a previously competent patient's desires when the decision
regarding life-sustaining treatment finally arises. See, e.g., Evans v. Bellevue Hosp.,
N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (court will not resort to "specu-
lation and conjecture" to resolve meaning of "amorphous expression" in patient's living
will). See generally TASK FORCE, supra, at 75-77 (1987) (discussing uncertainty of usefulness
of living wills in New York and results of survey of hospitals and nursing homes).
Prior to the legislative enactment of the first natural death acts, Father Kevin D.
O'Rourke, O.P., prepared a "Christian Affirmation of Life," incorporating a "Christian liv-
ing will." See C. MCFADDEN, THE DIGNITY OF LIFE 279-81 (1976) (quoting O'Rourke, "Chris-
tian Affirmation of Life").
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physician, or a durable power of attorney or other vehicle authorizing an
agent to make decisions in the patient's behalf"9 Additionally, evidence
of intent may be deduced from a patient's religious beliefs and the tenets
of that religion.3 0
The other two tests formulated by the court, the "limited-objec-
tive"3' and "pure-objective 3 2 tests, were designed for situations where
there is insufficient evidence of the patient's wishes to forego life-sus-
29 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229-30. In Peter, the court construed the state's
durable power of attorney statute to authorize conveyance of durable authority to make
medical decisions. Peter, 108 N.J. at 378, 529 A.2d at 426; see also Note, Appointing an
Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1015-20 (1984) (recom-
mending such construction of durable power of attorney statutes). See generally Moore,
The Durable Power of Attorney as an Alternative to the Improper Use of Conservatorship
for Health-Care Decision-Making, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 631 (1986) (analysis of methods
utilized in surrogate decision-making suggesting that durable power of attorney be adopted
as ideal method for surrogate health care decision-making). The combined execution of a
living will and a durable power of attorney delegating authority to make health care deci-
sions could enhance the effectuation of an individual's wishes regarding medical treatment.
See id. at 673. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 145-47 (encouraging
use of durable power of attorney statutes in making decisions for incompetent patients).
However, because of uncertainty over whether durable power of attorney statutes per-
mit delegation of authority respecting health care decisions, a number of states have legisla-
tively sanctioned the appointment of agents to make health care decisions through specific
legislation, amendment of durable power of attorney statutes, or direct incorporation in liv-
ing will legislation. See TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at 79 (referring to and citing sixteen
state statutes). In its study, the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law ultimately
proposed "health care proxy" legislation specifically providing for the appointment of an
agent to make health care decisions for those who subsequently lose decision-making capac-
ity. See id. at 71-139, 149-59.
SO Conroy, 98 N.J. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1230; see Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 372, 420 N.E.2d at
68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. In Eichner, evidence that the patient, a Catholic Brother who ex-
isted in a persistent vegetative state, had previously expressed approval of the Pope's pro-
nouncement of the Catholic Church's position-permitting the withholding or withdrawal of
"extraordinary" life-sustaining treatment where the patient stood no reasonable hope of re-
turning to cognitive life-helped establish the requisite "clear and convincing" proof of his
previously expressed desires regarding removal of his respirator. See id.; see also In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 412, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (1987) (tenets of patient's religion neither re-
quired nor forbade treatment at issue; thus, patient's religious affiliation offered little guid-
ance as to her preferences).
3, Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. The "limited-objective test" is satisfied where
there is "some trustworthy evidence" of the patient's wishes to forego the treatment and the
surrogate decision-maker "is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens [i.e., pain and suffer-
ing] of the patient's continued life with the treatment [markedly] outweigh the benefits [i.e.,
physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction] of that life for him." Id.
31 Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The "pure-objective test" applies where there is no "trust-
worthy evidence" of the patient's intent, and will be satisfied only where "the net burdens
of the patient's life with the treatment ... clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that
the patient derives from life" and "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain . . . with the
treatment" make it inhumane to administer the life-sustaining treatment. Id.
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taining treatment. If either of these two tests is satisfied, the withholding
or withdrawal of medical treatment is permitted under the premise that
withholding or withdrawing treatment is in the patient's "best
interests.""s
" See id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231-32. The opinion makes clear that the two "best inter-
ests" tests are restricted evaluations of the patient's life in terms of "pain, suffering and
possible enjoyment," and are not based on the "social utility" or the quality of that life to
others, thereby adding a measure of protection to the "socially isolated and defenseless peo-
ple suffering from physical and mental handicaps." Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33. Compare
the Conroy "best interests" tests to the assessment of the patient's best interests proposed
by the President's Commission. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 135. The
President's Commission determined that an assessment of a patient's best interests requires
consideration of "objective, societally shared criteria," such as "relief of suffering, preserva-
tion or restoration of functioning, and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained." Id.
For an insightful analysis and criticism of the Conroy "best interests" tests, see generally N.
CANTOR, supra note 26, at 68-76, and N. Cantor, supra note 4, at 563-70 (1985).
A recent New York case, In re Beth Israel Medical Center (Weinstein), N.Y.L.J., Sept.
15, 1987, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), adopted the Conroy "best interests" tests in
refusing medical treatment-a surgical amputation of a gangrenous leg-on behalf of an
elderly, incompetent nursing home patient with a limited life expectancy, suffering from
"severe and permanent mental and physical debilitations," who had not previously made
her wishes sufficiently known. Id. The court, in adopting a "best interests" analysis, gleaned
legislative approval of surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients who have not
provided sufficient indication of their treatment choice from section 80 of New York's
Mental Hygiene Law, which provides for surrogate decision-making at mental hygiene facili-
ties under a "best interests" approach. See id. at 6, col. 6. The court stated that a presump-
tion favoring life or life-prolonging procedures would prevail unless it could be "established
by clear and convincing evidence that the burdens of continued life for this patient mark-
edly outweigh the benefits that furthering life would bring." Id. To clarify the application of
the standard which the court promulgated, a dozen factors, illustrative of the considerations
to be taken into account in order to weigh the benefits and the burdens, were enumerated.
Id. at 7, col. 1. Ultimately, the court decided that the proposed amputation was not in the
patient's best interests. Id.
Beth Israel represents a significant step in New York case law. In the seminal case, In
re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981), the New York Court of Appeals allowed the removal of a respirator from a perma-
nently unconscious patient based on evidence of the patient's previously expressed compe-
tent wishes, but offered no mechanism for decision-making absent such clearly expressed
desires. Furthermore, in the companion case to Eichner, the court of appeals declined to
allow a "best interests" approach when it refused to allow the parent of a profoundly re-
tarded, never competent patient to order the discontinuance of blood transfusions, even
though the patient was terminally ill with incurable cancer. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). Beth Israel is properly
distinguishable from Storar, which primarily relied on the State's parens patriae interest in
refusing to authorize the discontinuance of blood transfusions. See id. at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d
at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. Additionally, the court of appeals explicitly called for judicial
restraint aimed at resolving issues on a case by case basis. Id. at 370 & n.2, 420 N.E.2d at 67
& n.2, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269 & n.2. Arguably, however, Storar and Eichner preclude the
adoption of surrogate decision-making under a "best interests" analysis for terminally ill or
permanently unconscious patients who fail to leave sufficient evidence of their treatment
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The Peter court appropriately held that the Conroy "best interests"
tests, focusing primarily on pain, are not applicable to patients in a per-
sistent vegetative state who, "[b]y definition ... do not experience any of
the benefits or burdens that the Conroy balancing tests are intended or
able to appraise." 4 Instead, the court determined that the Conroy "sub-
jective test"3 should apply "in every surrogate-refusal-of-treatment case
regardless of the patient's medical condition or life expectancy,""6 and
that, under Quinlan, the proper focus regarding vegetative patients
should be on the prognosis and possibility of return to cognitive, sapient
life.17 Whereas the Conroy court found the limited life-expectancy of a
severely physically impaired and demented patient to be a significant cri-
terion, the Peter court stated that "[u]nder Quinlan, the life-expectancy
of a patient in a persistent vegetative state is not an important criterion
in determining whether life-sustaining treatment may be [withheld or]
withdrawn."" The court, applying the Conroy "subjective test," found
that Ms. Peter did in fact leave clear and convincing evidence of her de-
sire to forego treatment under the circumstances.3 Because the "subjec-
tive test" was held to have been satisfied, the court deemed it unneces-
sary to detail the application of the Quinlan guidelines to a vegetative
nursing home patient.40 As in Conroy, the court in Peter found no dis-
preferences. See People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 357, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436,
446 (1984) (dictum) ("Under existing law, third parties are without authority to determine
on behalf of the terminally ill that they should be permitted to die. This court will make no
judgment as to what is for another an unacceptable quality of life.").
", Peter, 108 N.J. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 425. The court believed that the benefits-burdens
analysis of the Conroy "best interests" test, though difficult to apply with respect to cogni-
tively impaired patients like Ms. Conroy, would be virtually impossible to apply to perma-
nently unconscious patients like Ms. Peter. Id. at 376, 529 A.2d at 425.
"5 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
" See Peter, 108 N.J. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425. Looking to the now incompetent patient's
wishes in all circumstances has the salutary effect of assuring citizens that their desires
regarding the dying process will not go unrecognized after they become helpless. See Cantor,
supra note 4, at 556.
S See Peter, 108 N.J. at 374, 529 A.2d at 424.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425.
40 See id. The same day it decided the Peter case, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). Jobes involved a non-elderly nursing home
patient in a persistent vegetative state who did not leave sufficiently clear and convincing
evidence of her desire to forego artificial nourishment under the circumstances. Id. at 399,
529 A.2d at 436. In Jobes, because the "subjective test" was not satisfied, the court was
required to establish guidelines and procedures for surrogate decision-making on behalf of a
non-elderly patient in a persistent vegetative state under the Quinlan approach. See id. at
412-13, 529 A.2d at 443. Adopting the Quinlan approach, which allows the family and
guardian to render their "best judgment" as to what the patient would do under the circum-
stances, Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664, the court determined that the family and
guardian need not present clear and convincing proof of the patient's intent but, instead,
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tinction between withholding or withdrawing artificial feeding devices,
such as a nasogastric tube, and other forms of life-sustaining treatment,
such as a respirator."' Furthermore, the court believed that dehydration
would not necessarily be distressing or painful for a patient unable to
sense thirst or hunger so that withholding or withdrawing artificial feed-
ing would not result in more pain than termination of other medical
procedures."'
may infer from their presumably intimate knowledge of the patient his or her likely treat-
ment preferences under the facts and circumstances. See Jobes, 108 N.J. at 414-15, 529 A.2d
at 444-45. This is apparently a true "substituted judgment" approach.
" Peter, 108 N.J. at 382, 529 A.2d at 428 (reaffirming and quoting Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-
74, 486 A.2d at 1236); see also TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at 40 (patient's right to refuse
treatment applies to artificial nutrition and hydration); Dresser & Boisaubin, Ethics, Law,
and Nutritional Support, 145 ARCH. INT. MED. 122, 122 (1985) (nutrition governed by same
considerations as other medical treatment); Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be
Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 21 (1983) (no morally relevant dis-
tinction); Statement of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association, Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (Mar. 15,
1986) ("life prolonging treatment includes medication and artificially or technologically sup-
plied respiration, nutrition or hydration"). For additional sources supporting the proposi-
tion that no distinction exists between foregoing artificial feeding and other life-sustaining
treatment, and for sources contradicting such proposition, see infra note 96.
In Conroy, the court acknowledged the perceived "emotional symbolism" of food and
the psychosocial satisfaction derived by patients and care-givers from the provision of nutri-
tion. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-73, 486 A.2d at 1236; see also Callahan, On Feeding the
Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22, 22 (1983) (feeding hungry human beings "is the perfect
symbol of the fact that human life is inescapably social and communal"); Carson, The Sym-
bolic Significance of Giving to Eat and Drink, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 84, 87 (J.
Lynn ed. 1986) ("symbolic significance resides in the mutuality of giving to eat and drink
and of taking food and water"); Derr, Nutrition and Hydration as Elective Therapy:
Brophy and Jobes from an Ethical and Historical Perspective, 2 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 25, 33-
34 (1986) (providing food and fluids has "special cultural and symbolic significance"). How-
ever, the Conroy court was persuaded that artificial feeding methods were sufficiently differ-
ent from connatural methods of providing nourishment because, like many other medical
procedures, they pose inherent risks and possible deleterious side effects. See Conroy, 98
N.J. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236. For commentary discussing the various benefits and burdens
posed by different artificial feeding methods, see Lo & Dornbrand, Guiding the Hand that
Feeds: Caring for the Demented Elderly, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 402, 403 (1984); Lynn &
Childress, supra, at 18; Major, supra note 3, at 24-27.
2 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 373-74, 486 A.2d at 1236. Doctors Lo and Dornbrand suggest that
where the burdens of feeding outweigh the benefits, "[i]nstead of being humane care, tube
feedings may be painful, invasive, and impersonal for some patients." Lo & Dornbrand,
supra note 41, at 403. Doctor Lynn and Professor Childress argue that some patients may
die more comfortably without artificial hydration because "[tlerminal pulmonary edema,
nausea, and mental confusion are more likely when patients have been treated to maintain
fluid and nutrition until close to the time of death." Lynn & Childress, supra note 41, at 19.
They further note that severely demented patients requiring restraints and sedatives for
effective administration of artificial nutrition could be deprived of whatever pleasant exper-
iences that could otherwise have been available. Id.; see also Dresser & Boisaubin, supra
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In addition to articulating the tests to be applied by surrogate deci-
sion-makers in reaching decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treat-
ment, the New Jersey Supreme Court has been concerned with formulat-
ing the procedures which decision-makers would have to comply with in
order to justify such decisions. In Conroy, because the court perceived
differences between nursing home and hospital patients and institutions,
it set forth decision-making procedures uniquely suited for incompetent,
elderly nursing home patients.4 3 Similarly, in Peter, the court formulated
procedures to safeguard the decision-making process regarding elderly
nursing home patients in a persistent vegetative state.44
note 41, at 124 (noting hospice workers have observed that dehydration can ultimately de-
crease breathing problems, vomiting, and incontinence); Schmitz & O'Brien, Observations
on Nutrition and Hydration in Dying Cancer Patients, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS
29, 30 (J. Lynn ed. 1986) (discussing beneficial and detrimental effects of dehydration based
on observations in professional hospice setting).
43 See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374-85, 486 A.2d at 1237-42. The court pointed to the general
vulnerability and usual lack of surviving family members of nursing home residents, as well
as the limited role of physicians and the unlikely presence of an "ethics" or "prognosis"
committee to review an attending physician's prognosis at nursing homes as compared to
hospitals. Id. at 374-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38. An oversight function was entrusted to the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly, a state administrative agency
whose authority is legislatively mandated. Id. at 379-80, 486 A.2d at 1239-40. Upon notifica-
tion by the family, guardian, attending physician, friend, or by any person who believes
there exists a possibility of "abuse" by the decision-maker, the Ombudsman must investi-
gate the situation and within twenty-four hours report to an appropriate state agency, and
should, within his discretionary power, appoint two physicians, unaffiliated with the nursing
home, to secure confirmation of the patient's medical condition and prognosis. Id. at 383-84,
486 A.2d at 1241-42. It is important to realize that the New Jersey courts have avoided
becoming enmeshed in the decision-making process, preferring instead to set the guidelines
and procedures in order to facilitate decision-making by interested private parties. Entrust-
ing the oversight to the auspices of an administrative agency, peculiarly mandated to guard
the interests of a particularly vulnerable class of citizens, should prove a propitious en-
deavor provided the agency is adequately funded and staffed and appropriately engaged by
concerned parties. See, e.g., Paris & Varga, Care of the Hopelessly Ill, 151 AM. 141, 144
(1984) (calling for system of disinterested review of decisions on behalf of institutionalized
elderly).
" See Peter, 108 N.J. at 383-84, 529 A.2d at 429. Before withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from such a patient, the surrogate decision-maker should inform the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly of that decision. Id. After being
notified, the Ombudsman should procure the opinions of two independent physicians to
confirm the prognosis that there is no possibility of return to cognitive, sapient life, the
outcome of discontinuing the treatment, and available medical alternatives. Id. Only after
receiving the requisite confirmations from two independent physicians should the
Ombudsman defer to the decision of a properly designated surrogate decision-maker. See id.
In Peter, following adjudication of Ms. Peter's incompetency and appointment of a guard-
ian, the guardian notified the Ombudsman and requested approval of the decision to remove
the nasogastric tube. Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 422. Ultimately, the Ombudsman refused to
consent to the removal of the nasogastric tube, and Ms. Peter's guardian appealed that
determination. See id. at 372 & n.2, 529 A.2d at 422 & n.2. Because the court found that the
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C. New York Courts Address the Issue
Courts in states other than New Jersey have similarly rejected the
distinction between artificial nourishment and other life-sustaining treat-
ment in upholding a patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hy-
dration.4 5 In New York, the Appellate Division, Second Department, re-
cently addressed this issue in Delio v. Westchester County Medical
Center.4 6 In Delio, the conservator of a thirty-three-year-old patient,
Daniel Delio, a former exercise physiologist who was in a persistent vege-
tative state with no hope of recovery, had sought the removal of two sur-
gically inserted feeding tubes.4 7 The court phrased the broad issue as
"whether the common-law right to decline medical treatment... encom-
passes a right to remove or withhold artificial means of nourishment and
Conroy subjective test was satisfied, the case was remanded to the Ombudsman to recon-
sider the guardian's request for approval of the decision to order removal of the nasogastric
tube. Id. at 385, 529 A.2d at 430. Eventually, Ms. Peter's wishes were effectuated: the naso-
gastric tube was removed after approval by the Ombudsman, and Ms. Peter died at the
nursing home shortly thereafter. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, at B2, col. 5.
41 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the right of a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state to have a gastrostomy tube removed, agreeing with the Conroy court's
view that "the primary focus should be the patient's desires and experience of pain and
enjoyment-not the type of treatment involved." Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398
Mass. 417, 435, 497 N.E.2d 626, 636 (1986) (quoting Conroy, 98 N.J. at 369, 486 A.2d at
1209). Similarly, the distinction has been rejected by other state high courts recently ad-
dressing this issue. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (1987);
In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954 (Me. 1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 563, 747 P.2d
445, 454 (1987) (en banc).
In California, an appellate court held that a competent patient who was severely physi-
cally debilitated, but not terminally ill, had the right to have removed a nasogastric tube,
which had been inserted without her consent. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
1127, 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (1986). Prior to Bouvia, the same court, in the context of
a criminal prosecution of two doctors, had found the administration of artificial nourish-
ment indistinguishable from the use of a respirator or other forms of life-sustaining treat-
ment. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490
(1983). A Florida appellate court found no basis for distinguishing between "'forced' suste-
nance" and " 'forced' continuance of vital functions," and upheld the right of an elderly
patient in a persistent vegetative state to have her nasogastric tube removed. Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). For a list of selected state court
cases involving artificial feeding, see SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 3, at 7.
46 129 App. Div. 2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987).
,7 Id. at 3-4, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80. Medical testimony indicated that Daniel, while not
technically "dead" under New York standards, see People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472
N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984) (irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain constitutes death), had no reasonable prospect for regaining cognitive awareness or
consciousness, although he could be sustained indefinitely in a vegetative state. See Delio,
129 App. Div. 2d at 10 & n.2, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 683-84 & 684 n.2. Although Daniel had not
executed a living will, the court was satisfied that the evidence adduced at the hearing below
conclusively established that Daniel would have refused the artificial feeding under the cir-
cumstances. Id. at 6, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
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hydration to an individual in a persistent vegetative state with no hope of
recovery."4 For guidance, the court looked to New York's seminal case,
Eichner v. Dillon.
49
Eichner involved an eighty-three-year-old Catholic Brother, Brother
Fox, who had been maintained in a persistent vegetative state with the
help of a respirator due to his inability to breathe spontaneously.8 0 The
New York Court of Appeals held that the common-law right to refuse
medical treatment extends to termination of life-sustaining procedures
where there is "clear and convincing" proof that the patient, while com-
petent, personally expressed a desire to have such treatment withheld or
withdrawn under the circumstances and no countervailing state interest
exists which would preclude terminating the treatment."
As to the question of the propriety of terminating artificial nourish-
ment, the Delio court did not interpret Eichner as being limited to re-
moval of respirators. Instead, the Delio court discerned from Eichner that
the court of appeals had focused primarily on the patient's desire to
forego medical treatment, and not on the specific type of treatment in-
volved.5 The leading New Jersey case, Conroy, which had rejected the
" Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 2, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
50 Id. at 370-71, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. Father Eichner, a superior of
Brother Fox, sought appointment as committee of the person and property of Brother Fox
and authority to order the disconnection of the respirator. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 269. The uncontroverted testimony adduced below established that Brother Fox
had no reasonable hope of recovery, and that, when competent, Brother Fox had consist-
ently expressed the view that under such circumstances he would want the respirator re-
moved. See id. at 371-72, 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270, 274.
81 See id. at 377-80, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
" Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 16, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. The trial judge in Delio was reluc-
tant to extend Eichner, which he believed was distinguishable because, whereas Brother Fox
was eighty-three years old, terminally ill, and sustained by a respirator, Daniel was only
thirty-three, not terminally ill, and sustained by artificial feeding. See id. at 12, 516
N.Y.S.2d at 685. The appellate court, however, found that the age of a persistently vegeta-
tive patient is relevant only to the question of the weight of the evidence of the patient's
previously expressed desires to refuse treatment. See id. at 21, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 690. Regard-
ing a patient's medical condition, the court stated that "while the terminal nature of an
illness may be relevant in treatment decisions made by a competent person, it is of little
practical relevance in cases involving a person existing in a chronic vegetative state with no
hope of recovery." Id. at 22, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 691; see also In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 374-77,
529 A.2d 419, 424-25 (1987) (neither patient's life-expectancy nor nature of patient's medi-
cal condition in terms of ability to experience benefits and burdens are relevant to deciding
whether to withhold or withdraw treatment from persistently vegetative patient). The court
commented further that, "[in fact, the absence of a terminal illness may serve to reinforce
the decision to discontinue life-sustaining treatment" because sustaining the patient in a
vegetative condition may yield no benefits to the patient, other than "mere existence," and
cause "continued indignities and dehumanization." Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 22, 516
N.Y.S.2d at 691.
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distinction between artificial feeding and other forms of life-sustaining
procedures, was deemed persuasive and instructive." Applying the princi-
ples formulated in Eichner, the Delio court found that none of the com-
monly designated, potentially countervailing state interests were weighty
enough to override Daniel's right to refuse medical treatment, and was
satisfied that there was "clear and convincing" evidence of Daniel's
desires, when competent, to have the feeding tube removed under the cir-
cumstances." Ultimately, the court upheld Daniel's right to refuse artifi-
cial nourishment.55
Prior to Delio, a New York trial court, in Vogel v. Forman," declined
to allow the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nourishment by refus-
ing to authorize the removal of a nasogastric tube sustaining a perma-
nently unconscious patient, despite testimony that the patient, when
competent, had expressed a desire not to be maintained by artificial
means.57 The same court, following the holdings of Vogel and the trial
court's decision in Delio, had also recently denied a petitioner's applica-
tion for the appointment of a guardian with authority to order the with-
drawal of a life-sustaining nasogastric tube from a permanently uncon-
scious patient; however, in light of the appellate decision in Delio, the
court granted a motion to reargue and decided the petition under the
binding authority of Delio.58 Under Delio, a patient in a persistent vege-
tative state with no hope of recovery, though neither terminally ill nor
legally brain-dead, and arguably one with severe and permanent mental
53 Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 17, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 688. The Conroy court also rejected the
commonly recognized distinction between "ordinary" treatment-required procedures which
cannot be refused-and "extraordinary" treatment-optional procedures which may be re-
fused. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 370-71, 486 A.2d at 1234-35. The court believed that such a
distinction was merely an exercise in semantics, tending to blur the substantive analysis,
which should not be employed when determining whether to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. See id. For other views on the ordinary/extraordinary distinction, see
infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 22-26, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 691-94.
See id. at 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 693-94. The judgment below was reversed and the conser-
vator authorized to direct the withdrawal of the feeding tubes. See id. at 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d at
694.
" 134 Misc. 2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1986).
Id. at 397-99, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 623-24. The court drew a distinction between authorizing
withdrawal of "extraordinary" life-support apparatuses from brain-dead or terminally ill pa-
tients with no hope of recovery and withdrawal of "ordinary" life-sustaining nourishment
from patients who, like Mr. Vogel, are unable to care for themselves due to illness, age, or
other physical incapacity. See id. at 398-99, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 624. The court believed that to
allow withdrawal of artificial nourishment would be to sanction death by starvation and
contravene the policies of the state and a humane society. Id.
" See In re Chetta, No. 1086/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Feb. 26, 1988) (Becker,
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and physical impairments with a limited life expectancy," could have ar-
tificial nourishment withheld or withdrawn. 60 The primary focus of a
court should be on the patient's desire and right to have treatment termi-
nated under the circumstances."'
In another recent case decided prior to Delio, Women's Circle Home
and Infirmary for the Aged v. Fink,6 2 a New York trial court authorized
the surrogate decision-makers of a terminally ill, elderly nursing home
patient in a persistent vegetative state to withhold consent to the per-
formance of a gastrostomy necessary to sustain the patient."3 Authoriza-
tion to order the withholding or withdrawal of intravenous feeding, how-
ever, was denied, even though the court found "clear and convincing"
evidence that the patient, when competent, had expressed her desire to
0' See In re Beth Israel Medical Center (Weinstein), N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1987, at 6, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); see also In re Westchester County Medical Center, 139 App. Div.
2d 344, 532 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2d Dep't 1988). In Westchester County Medical Center, the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, recently upheld the right of an incompetent patient to
have artificial feeding withheld or withdrawn where the patient was neither comatose nor in
a persistent vegetative state, but had suffered "'irreparable'" damage due to multiple
strokes, had "no chance for 'a meaningful mental status recovery,'" and would "'never im-
prove from' her present condition." Id. at 346, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The majority opinion
also referred to the speculation of Ms. O'Connor's attending physician that insertion of a
nasogastric tube to replace intravenous feeding, which was becoming ineffective, would pro-
long Ms. O'Connor's life for several months to a year or two. Id. Dissenting, Justice Balletta
maintained, however, that the facts proved that Ms. O'Connor's condition had not been
diagnosed as terminal and that to some extent she was awake, alert, and cognizant. Id. at
353-54, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 139 (Balletta, J., dissenting). Justice Balletta believed that Ms.
O'Connor's condition was not as severe as comatose, vegetative, and brain dead patients. Id.
at 358, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (Balletta, J., dissenting). Justice Balletta determined that New
York courts have not authorized the withholding or withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining
treatment where the patient is not comatose, in a persistently vegetative state, or terminally
ill, and, consequently, would have refused authorization. Id. at 354, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 139
(Balletta, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of this case, see infra note 67.
" See Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 2-3, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
"' See id. at 16, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. The only significant question unanswered in the
Vogel case then was whether the evidence of the patient's desire to terminate the artificial
nourishment was "clear and convincing." The court's reasoning enabled it to avoid that
determination. In Chetta, the court had initially found that the evidence of the patient's
previously expressed intent to refuse artificial life-sustaining treatment was clear and con-
vincing, but upon reargument, under the guidance of Delio, the court determined that the
evidence was in fact not clear and convincing. See Chetta, No. 1086/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County Feb. 26, 1988) (Becker, J.). Even when a permanently unconscious patient
has not sufficiently expressed his or her competent desires, it is suggested that the New
York courts allow either the family or guardian, or other health care decision-making agent,
in conjunction with physicians, to infer from their intimate knowledge of the patient his or
her likely treatment preferences, and to reach a decision on that basis regardless of the type
of treatment involved.
62 135 Misc. 2d 270, 514 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1987).
6S Id. at 270-74, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 894-96.
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forego life-sustaining treatment if there were no hope of recovery." The
Fink decision, in so far as it denied authorization to discontinue intrave-
nous feeding under the reasoning that discontinuance thereof would
hasten death and thereby be the cause of death, would not pass muster
under Delio or the persuasive authority of Conroy, which had expressly
rejected the value and use of the distinction between actively hastening
death and allowing death to naturally ensue.6 5 Notwithstanding the Delio
court's willingness to allow the withholding or withdrawal of artificial
nourishment under specified circumstances, however, the issue remains
unsettled in New York,6" at least until addressed by the New York Court
64 Id. at 272-74, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96. The apparent inconsistency in the decision resulted
from the court's view that withdrawal of the intravenous feeding would hasten death and
disturb the status quo, whereas performance of the gastrostomy would contradict the pa-
tient's previously expressed desires. See id. at 273-74, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96.
65 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 369, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233-34 (1985). See generally Brock,
Forgoing Life-Sustaining Food and Water: Is It Killing?, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS
117, 117-29 (J. Lynn ed. 1986) (discussing moral distinctions drawn between killing and
allowing to die, and causing and not causing death). Moreover, only two months after the
Fink decision, and after the appellate decision in Delio, the same court which decided Fink
was faced with another application seeking permission to refuse artificial feeding. See In re
Strauss, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1987, at 12, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County). Justice Tompkins,
presiding again, explained that in Fink, "[tihis Court distinguished between the failure to
take extraordinary measures such as surgery and the ordinary provision of nutrients." Id.
However, the Justice felt obligated to adhere to the authority of Delio, and upon finding
"clear and convincing" evidence that the permanently unconscious patient would have re-
fused artificial feeding, authorized the surrogate decision-makers to refuse "feeding by ei-
ther intravenous or tubular means." Id. at 12, col. 4. Justice Tompkins' determination is
consonant with the Delio court's rejection of the distinction between artificial feeding and
other life-sustaining treatment, and properly focuses on the patient's right to refuse all life-
sustaining treatment under the circumstances. See Delio, 129 App. Div. 2d at 19, 516
N.Y.S.2d at 689.
" Daniel Delio died shortly after the appellate division's decision; consequently, no appeal
was taken. Strauss, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1987, at 12, col. 4 n.3. This Article suggests that the
court of appeals' prior decision, In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), should not stand for the proposition that artificial
feeding must not be withheld or withdrawn from a patient who is incapable of making treat-
ment decisions and who did not sufficiently express his or her desire not to be kept alive
through artificial means. In Storar, the court of appeals refused to allow the mother of a
terminally ill, never competent, profoundly retarded patient to order the withholding of life-
sustaining blood transfusions. Id. at 380-82, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-76.
Rather than focusing on the fact that the patient was terminally ill, the court analogized
blood transfusions to food and reasoned that such treatments could eliminate the risk of
death from a treatable cause. Id. at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. That reason-
ing formed the basis for the court's denial of the patient's mother's request to discontinue
the transfusions under the state's parens patriae interest. See id. at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at
73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76. It is submitted that the court of appeals can best serve the
interests of terminally ill patients by rejecting the Storar court's implicit disapproval of the
withholding or withdrawal of nourishment and by adopting the reasoning of the Delio court
that the proper focus should be on the patient and his desires regarding life-sustaining med-
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of Appeals."7
One commentator has argued that there are real and substantial dif-
ferences between disconnecting a respirator and disconnecting a feeding
tube.68 This commentator explains that, in contrast to the disconnection
of a respirator, as in the Quinlan and Eichner cases, where the patient
could live or die after disconnection, the disconnection of a feeding tube
indubitably precipitates death "just as surely as if the doctor had shot the
ical treatment rather than the type of treatment. Furthermore, in cases where an incompe-
tent, terminally ill patient has not sufficiently made his desires known, the court should be
willing to allow surrogate decision-making based on the patient's "best interests" or, if the
patient is permanently unconscious, on the surrogate decision-maker's "best judgment" of
the patient's preferences.
"7 In August of 1988, the Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld the right of an
incompetent seventy-seven year old patient, Mary O'Connor, to refuse nasogastric and in-
travenous feeding. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 139 App. Div. 2d 344, 345, 532
N.Y.S.2d 133, 133 (2d Dep't 1988). The appellate court upheld the lower court's finding that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Ms. O'Connor, when competent, expressed a
desire to refuse artificial life-sustaining treatment, which was held to include artificial feed-
ing notwithstanding Ms. O'Connor's failure to articulate the specific type of life-sustaining
treatments she would want withheld or withdrawn. Id. at 345, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 136. For
further discussion of this case, see supra note 59.
While this Article was in print, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision
reached by the appellate division in Westchester County Medical Center. See In re
O'Connor, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1988, at 21, col. 3. The court of appeals confirmed the applica-
bility of the "clear and convincing" evidence standard as enunciated in Eichner, and further
elaborated that under this standard "[niothing less than unequivocal proof will suffice when
the decision to terminate life supports is at issue." Id. at 28, col. 5. Upon reviewing the
record, the court held that there was not "clear and convincing proof that the patient had
made a firm and settled commitment, while competent, to decline this type of medical assis-
tance under circumstances such as these." Id. at 21, col. 4. Implicitly, the court recognized
the propriety of withholding or withdrawing artificial feeding under proper circumstances.
In addition, the court refused to adopt a substituted judgment approach and adhered to an
inquiry limited to ascertaining and then effectuating the patient's expressed desires. Id. at
28, col. 6. The court stated:
That approach [substituted judgment] remains unacceptable because it is inconsis-
tent with our fundamental commitment to the notion that no person or court should
substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another
(People v. Eulo . . .). Consequently, we adhere to the view that, despite its pitfalls
and inevitable uncertainties, the inquiry must always be narrowed to the patient's
expressed intent, with every effort made to minimize the opportunity for error.
Id. Hence, as the court declared, the focus in New York "must always be on what the pa-
tient would say if asked today whether the treatment in issue should be terminated." Id.
However, three of the seven judges believed that New York should recognize some proce-
dure for addressing the withholding or withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining means for pa-
tients who cannot or have not adequately expressed their desires. Id. at 29, col. 4 (Simons,
J., dissenting).
68 See Note, Withholding Food and Water from a Patient-Should it be Condoned in Cali-
fornia?, 16 PAC. L.J. 877, 890-91 (1985).
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patient.""s To the contrary, in instances where a patient requires an arti-
ficial feeding tube due to an inability to swallow, discontinuance thereof,
like removal of a respirator from a patient unable to breathe spontane-
ously, "merely acquiesces in the natural cessation of a critical bodily
function," and death arises because of the underlying medical problem,
not the withdrawal.
70
Another commentator has concluded that "[p]roviding artificial
nourishment and hydration to a terminally ill comatose patient . . .
should not be confused with providing food and water to a starving but
otherwise well person."'7' This distinction was evidently not recognized in
the recent New York case, In re Brooks (Leguerrier).7 2 Brooks involved a
petition by a nursing home seeking authority to force feed an elderly
nursing home resident, who was considered capable of making health care
decisions, 7 either intravenously or through a nasogastric tube, because
09 Id. at 891. The author further states that "[riemoving a feeding tube is necessarily incom-
patible with the patient's survival. Food, unlike respiration, is never self-generating and
must always come from a source outside the patient's own body. The disconnection of feed-
ing tubes does not allow for alternative outcomes .... " Id. (footnotes omitted); see also
Derr, supra note 41, at 28-29 (1986) (withholding or withdrawing food and fluids deemed
"biologically final"); Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream, 14
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11, 12 (1984) (patient will surely die without nourishment). What the
author says is apparently unassailable. What the author fails to realize, however, is that in
cases such as Peter and Delio, the court is not sanctioning death, even though death will
ineluctably ensue. Rather, the court is attempting to effectuate the patient's desires and
indelible right to refuse medical treatment under the circumstances. There is an ostensibly
equal expectation that death will ensue upon removal of a respirator even though sometimes
death is thwarted by the patient's spontaneous respiration.
70 Peter, 108 N.J. at 382, 529 A.2d at 428; see In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955-56 (Me.
1987); see also O'Rourke, The A.M.A. Statement on Tube Feeding: An Ethical Analysis,
155 AM. 321, 322 (1986) (withholding artificial feeding permits "existing fatal pathology to
take its natural course"). But see Barry, Facing Hard Cases: The Ethics of Assisted Feed-
ing, 2 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 99, 102-03 (1986) ("To bring a person to death, who is not at
death's doorstep, by withdrawing food and fluids is to directly cause death and is not a case
of allowing the person to die from an underlying pathological condition.").
"' Note, supra note 20, at 260-61.
72 No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10, 1987) (Conway, J.); see also In re
Plaza Health & Rehab. Center (Sup. Ct. Onandaga County Feb. 2, 1984) (Miller, J.) (denied
petition of nursing home requesting authority to artificially feed competent nursing home
patient who was neither terminally ill nor unable to eat). See generally Brock & Lynn, The
Competent Patient Who Decides Not to Take Nutrition and Hydration, in By No Ex-
TRAORDINARY MEANS 202 (J. Lynn, ed. 1986) (health care providers are not justified in seek-
ing to force-feed competent and informed patients who elect to forego food and drink).
73 See Brooks, No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10, 1987) (Conway, J.).
The court evidently accepted the assessments of the attending physician and a social worker
that the patient was rational and capable of making such a decision, although a psychiatrist
believed otherwise. See id. The President's Commission had concluded that " 'decisionmak-
ing incapacity' rests on a judgment of the type that an informed layperson might
make-that a patient lacks sufficient ability to understand a situation and to make a choice
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she refused to eat or drink."' The court denied the petition,7 yet the
court's decision lacked reasoned explication. The court merely cited New
York's leading cases and, without qualification, deemed itself bound by
the "many decisions of the Court of Appeals" and "the recent decision of
the Appellate Division [Delio]. '"T Apparently, the court simply agreed
with the patient's guardian ad litem that the patient has an "absolute
right as a competent, rational person to decide for herself what will be
done to her body. '77 That right, however, is not absolute, but must be
weighed against any potentially countervailing state interests.7 The court
in Brooks, nevertheless, did not weigh the potentially countervailing state
interests against the patient's right to refuse artificial nourishment.79
The state's interest in the preservation of life is usually considered
the most significant of the state interests, but ordinarily it will not over-
ride a competent patient's right to refuse medical treatment.8 0 According
to the New Jersey Supreme Court, "the State's interest ... weakens and
the individual's right. . . grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims.""1 The Brooks opinion did not indicate the pa-
tient's prognosis, though it would have been a valid factor in the balanc-
ing process.
in light of that understanding." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 123. The New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law had noted that "in recent years the notion of
capacity to make health care decisions has emerged as an alternative to the traditional stan-
dard of competence." TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at 100. The Task Force contrasted "ca-
pacity" with "competence," the latter generally referring to a judicial determination about a
person's ability to make decisions. See id. On the other hand, "'capacity' is a more limited
and specific concept; it refers to a person's ability to make a particular decision as deter-
mined by health care professionals or others." Id. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 2, at 45, 121-26 (defining and discussing determination of decision-making ca-
pacity in context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment).
" Brooks, No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10, 1987) (Conway, J.).
" Id. The nursing home argued that as a Health Related Facility it had a duty under state
law and administrative rules and regulations, see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. 28 (McKinney
1985 & Supp. 1987); [19851 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 731.3(g), to provide requisite sustenance to pa-
tients entrusted to its care. Brooks, No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10,
1987) (Conway, J.). The nursing home further contended that state penal laws, see N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987), prohibited it from aiding or encouraging
suicide. See Brooks, No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10, 1987) (Conway,
J.). Finally, the nursing home contended that, although the court of appeals' decisions rec-
ognize a patient's right to refuse "extraordinary" life-sustaining treatment, such cases are
inapplicable to "mere feeding to prevent a patient from committing suicide." Id.
7' Brooks, No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10, 1987) (Conway, J.).
'7 Id. (citations omitted).
78 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
SI In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Im-
pliedly then, as the patient's prognosis improves, the state's interest strengthens.
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The state's interest in the prevention of suicide, which is somewhat
subsumed within the preservation of life interest, is another relevant in-
terest clearly implicated by the Brooks case. It may be reasoned, however,
that to refuse medical procedures in order to allow an illness to run its
inevitable course is not suicide: death is caused by the underlying illness
and not self-inflicted injury.82 The Brooks opinion did not specify
whether the patient was suffering from any disease or infirmity. One in-
ference which could be drawn is that the patient was not terminally ill.
Patients with pathological complications that make it impossible for them
to swallow and normally ingest food and water are readily distinguishable
from patients capable of swallowing through their normal faculties. The
latter precipitate the need for artificial feeding because of self-imposed
restraints and not from underlying incapacities. The state's interest in
preventing suicide becomes weightier, especially where the abstainer has
been entrusted to the care of a nursing institution."3 Although it appears
to be inconsistent with an institution's obligation to provide adequate nu-
trition to its patients, the Brooks court nevertheless upheld the right of a
patient, quite capable of eating or drinking normally, to starve herself to
death while remaining at the institution.8 4
III. CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY ON WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING
ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
A. Interest of the Catholic Church
There are several reasons why the Catholic Church is interested in
playing a role in public policy formulation regarding the issues involved
in refusal of medical treatment cases. The following reasons are particu-
larly significant: the interest of the Church in expressing Catholic theo-
logical perspectives where the issues implicate the disciplines of law,
medicine, and religion; and the desire of the Church to safeguard and
82 See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350-51, 486 A.2d at 1224.
83 Cf. Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 App. Div. 2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dep't 1982). In
Chapman, a case involving a hunger-striking prisoner, a New York appellate court held that
the state's interests were paramount to the rights asserted by an inmate who was attempting
to starve himself to death. Id. at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25. The court authorized the
state psychiatric center, where the prisoner was temporarily in custody, to force-feed him.
See id. But cf. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (upholding prisoner's
right to refuse nourishment). See generally Note, Should a Hunger-Striking Prisoner Be
Allowed to Die?, 25 B.C.L. REv. 423 (1984) (analyzing state's interests and prisoner's rights);
Note, Force-Feeding Hunger-Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis, 35 U. FLA. L.
REV. 99 (1983) (same).
s" See Brooks, No. 5805/87, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County June 10, 1987) (Conway, J.);
see also Brock & Lynn, supra note 72 (patient capable of deciding to forego nutrition and
hydration should be allowed).
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preserve the moral and religious principles which guide health care facili-
ties operating under Catholic auspices, and which are affected by legisla-
tive and judicial determinations."B
" See Brief and Appendix for Amicus Curiae, New Jersey Catholic Conference, at 1, In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (No. 26,041) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; see also
UNITED STATES CATHOLICS CONFERENCE, ETHICAL AND RELIGIous DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC
HEALTH FACILITIES 2 (1971) [hereinafter ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES] ("Any facility
identified as Catholic assumes ... the responsibility to reflect in its policies and practices
the moral teachings of the Church .... ).
In a recent New Jersey case, In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (Ch.
Div.), aff'd, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986), a hospital, controlled by a
Catholic religious order, was denied permission to compel the removal of a competent, ter-
minally ill elderly patient who, in contemplation of her loss of ability to swallow, anticipato-
rily refused artificial feeding. Id. at 447, 517 A.2d at 887. Despite the hospital's reaffirmation
of its policy against withholding food and water ("basic human needs"), and the willingness
of the hospital to assist in transferring the patient to a suitable institution, the court held
that under the circumstances the hospital's policy must yield to the patient's right to refuse
medical treatment notwithstanding the direct judicial interference with the hospital's policy.
Id. at 487-88, 517 A.2d at 892-93. Although a Catholic health care institution has legitimate
reason to be concerned over what it may perceive as judicial officiousness, the Requena
decision should be viewed as a limited exception to otherwise judicial reluctance to interfere
with hospital policy decisions. Because the patient, Ms. Requena, was not unconscious or
insensate, the court considered the possibility of emotional and psychological trauma to her
incident to a transfer of facilities. See id. at 480-81, 487, 517 A.2d at 889, 892-93. The trial
court found and was persuaded by the fact that Ms. Requena had developed a trust in and
affection for hospital personnel. See id. at 480-81, 487, 517 A.2d at 889, 893. The appellate
court was also influenced by the fact that the patient had become familiar with the sur-
roundings and personnel; moreover, it was persuaded by the fact that the patient had not
received adequate notice of the hospital's policy prior to her decision to refuse artificial
feeding. See In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 445, 517 A.2d 869, 870 (App. Div. 1986).
Thus, if the patient receives adequate notice of the hospital's policy of declining to honor
specified refusals of treatment, a court is less likely to view the hospital's decision as an
unreasonable interference with the patient's rights. Furthermore, where the patient is per-
manently unconscious there will be no need for the court to consider potential emotional
and psychological trauma to the patient incident to transfer and, in fact, courts have readily
deferred to the moral and ethical prerogatives of health care institutions by not compelling
them to withhold or withdraw treatment from permanently unconscious patients. See, e.g.,
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 440 & n.39, 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 & n.39
(1986) (preservation of ethical integrity of hospital and its staff possible without infringing
on patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration); Delio v. Westchester County
Medical Center, 129 App. Div. 2d 1, 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 693 (2d Dep't 1987) (court's
directive drawn in alternative to allow medical center to either assist in or withdraw artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration or find suitable facility to do so). But see, e.g., In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 424-26, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (1987) (nursing home could not refuse to participate in
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from patient whose family-surrogate deci-
sion-makers-had no notice of nursing home's asserted policy prior to decision to forego
treatment). See generally Annas, Transferring the Ethical Hot Potato, 17 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 20-21 (1987).
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B. Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment
Catholic theology teaches that life is a gift from God, a fundamental
though not absolute value, which each individual has a duty to preserve
and make prosperous.86 Because life is not an absolute value, it need not
be preserved under all circumstances; therefore, artificial life-sustaining
measures may be withheld or withdrawn when morally justified."' Tradi-
tionally, Catholic moral theology had applied an ordinary/extraordinary
dichotomy when distinguishing morally obligatory (ordinary) from mor-
ally optional (extraordinary) life-preserving means.88 However, the dis-
tinction between ordinary and extraordinary means has not resulted in a
systematic categorization of typical medical treatments by Catholic theo-
logians, particularly because of rapid advances in medical technology.8"
Moreover, it has been suggested that contemporary Catholic moral theol-
ogy no longer necessitates recourse to these terms for justifying when par-
ticular life-preserving means may morally be withheld or withdrawn, and,
instead, an analysis should be made in terms of "proportionate" and "dis-
proportionate" means.8 0
" See Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Euthanasia, in 25
THE POPE SPEAKS 289, 290-91 (1980) [hereinafter Declaration on Euthanasia]; Address of
Pope Pius XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists, The Prolongation of Life,
in 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 395 (1957) [hereinafter The Prolongation of Life]; see also Con-
nery, The Ethical Standards for Withholding/Withdrawing Nutrition and Hydration, 2
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 87, 87-88 (1986) ("positive duty to preserve life"); McCartney, Catholic
Positions on Withholding Sustenance for the Terminally 11, 67 HEALTH PROGRESS 38, 38
(1986) ("life is a basic and fundamental value").
11 McCartney, supra note 86, at 38; see also McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma
of Modern Medicine, 229 J. A.M.A. 172, 174 (1974) (duty to preserve life is limited duty
because life is a relative good); Walter, Food & Water: An Ethical Burden, 113 COMMON-
WEAL 616, 618 (1986) ("because life is not the highest good, it need not be preserved under
all conditions"). The Catholic church does recognize a "right to die," but only in the limited
sense of a "right to die peacefully and in a manner worthy of a human being and a Chris-
tian." Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 294.
8 See D. MCCARTHY & E. BAYER, HANDBOOK ON CRITICAL LIFE ISSUES 161-62 (1982) [herein-
after CRITICAL LIFE ISSUES]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 84 n.122; Walter,
supra note 87, at 618; The Prolongation of Life, supra note 86, at 395-96.
The following ethical directive for Catholic Health Facilities embodies the traditional
Catholic distinction: "Euthanasia ('mercy killing') in all its forms is forbidden. The failure
to supply the ordinary means of preserving life is equivalent to euthanasia. However,
neither the physician nor the patient is obliged to use extraordinary means." ETHICAL AND
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 85, at 8. For a survey and discussion of the interpretation
of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means drawn by early Catholic
ethicists, see generally Kelly, The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving Life, 11
THEOL. STUD. 203 (1950); McCartney, The Development of the Doctrine of Ordinary and
Extraordinary Means of Preserving Life in Catholic Moral Theology Before the Karen
Quinlan Case, 47 LINACRE Q. 215 (1980).
89 See Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 294.
90 See id. at 294; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 88-89. The President's Commis-
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The contemporary approach of Catholic moral theologians regarding
withholding or withdrawing artificial life-preserving means may be dis-
cerned from the analysis suggested by Father Gerald Kelly, S.J., a promi-
nent Jesuit ethicist.9 Father Kelly proposed that artificial life-preserving
means should not be considered morally obligatory if they do not offer a
reasonable hope of benefit or cannot be obtained without excessive bur-
den.9" Father Kelly's contemplation that Catholic moral theology espouse
an assessment of the utility of the proposed means-its efficacy in achiev-
ing the desired results-and the proportionality of benefits and burdens
is paralleled in the Vatican's latest pronouncement, its Declaration on
Euthanasia.93 An interpretation of the Vatican's pronouncement reveals
that when employing concepts of utility and proportionality in distin-
guishing whether the proposed treatment is obligatory or nonobligatory,
the assessment must be from the patient's perspective and must consider
the totality of the circumstances, including the interests of all affected
sion concluded that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction has become confusing and its use
in formulating public policy is no longer appealing. Id. at 88. Moreover, the President's
Commission remarked that the "overuse and misuse of the term[sJ" had caused the Vatican
to question the usefulness of the terminology and espouse an analysis utilizing the terms
"proportionate" and "disproportionate." Id. at 88 n.132. The President's Commission did,
however, acknowledge that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction does have moral signifi-
cance when interpreted based on the usefulness and burdensomeness of the treatment to
the particular patient, yet concluded that upon finding that the burdens significantly out-
weigh the benefits of the treatment, the assertion "that the treatment is extraordinary is
more of an expression of the conclusion than a justification for it." Id. at 88; see also Mei-
laender, The Confused, the Voiceless, the Perverse: Shall We Give Them Food and Drink,
2 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 133, 137 (1986) (use of the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" to
define distinction deemed "too imprecise").
"' See Kelly, supra note 88; Kelly, The Duty to Preserve Life, 12 THEOL. STUD. 550 (1951).
9' Kelly, supra note 91, at 550.
93 Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 289-96. The Vatican proposed that treat-
ment which is "not without risks or is excessively burdensome" is nonobligatory. Id. at 295.
The Vatican explained that to withhold or withdraw "the application of medical techniques
that are disproportionate to the value of the anticipated results" is morally justified, espe-
cially those treatments which "can only yield a precarious and painful prolongation of life."
See id. Numerous other Catholic authorities and theologians have endorsed an analysis
which embraces concepts of utility and proportionality. See U.S. Bishops' Committee for
Pro-Life Activities, supra note 28, at 223 ("we recognize and defend a patient's right to
refuse ... means which provide no benefit or which involve too grave a burden"); Bayer,
supra note 4, at 91 (not bound to prolong life by "impossible, substantially useless, or un-
reasonably burdensome" means); Connery, supra note 86, at 90 (can morally omit a means
which is useless in prolonging life or excessively burdensome); McCartney, supra note 86, at
40 ("uselessness criterion must instantiate the burdensomeness doctrine and not be an inde-
pendent justification in itself"); Paris, When Burdens of Feeding Outweigh Benefits, 16
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 32'(1986) (means must offer "substantial hope of benefit" and
burdens not disproportionate to benefits).
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parties.9 4 The significance of the foregoing analysis is that it reflects the
traditional theological acceptance of the principle that even means which
are relatively routine, non-invasive, inexpensive, and medically possible
and available may be nonobligatory, if in the totality of the circumstances
they would be futile or unreasonably burdensome to administer with re-
spect to the particular patient."9 This writer suggests, therefore, that
Catholic moral theologians avoid the terms "ordinary" and "extraordi-
nary" when attempting to justify the morality of withholding or with-
drawing artificial life-preserving means, and speak instead in terms of the
utility of the proposed means-its efficacy in achieving the desired re-
sult-and the proportionality of benefits and burdens in the totality of
the circumstances, all relative to the patient's condition and prognosis.
0' See Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 294. The Vatican declared that deter-
mining whether specific means may be withheld or withdrawn entails weighing "the type of
treatment, its degree of difficulty and danger, its expense, and the possibility of applying it"
against "the results that can be expected, all this in light of the sick person's condition and
resources of body and spirit." Id. at 294 (emphasis added). Father John J. Paris, S.J., ex-
plained that historically, moral theologians used the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
when referring to the patient's condition, not the specific type of treatment or means. Paris,
supra note 93, at 32; see also Walter, supra note 87, at 618 (distinction between "ordinary"
and "extraordinary" means originally based upon "patient-centered" assessment of benefits
and burdens). Father Paris contended that rapid advances in medical technology, unaccom-
panied by similar advances in moral theology, have led to a shift in the focus of the distinc-
tion from the patient and his condition to the type of means involved. See Paris, supra note
93, at 32. To some extent, this shift in focus could explain the position taken by those
Catholic authorities and theologians who espouse the view that there is always a moral obli-
gation to provide nutrition and hydration. See Walter, supra note 87, at 618. Papal pro-
nouncements have clearly expressed that the assessment of benefits and burdens is to be
made "according to the circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture" when deter-
mining if the means involved entail an excessive burden for the patient, family, or commu-
nity. The Prolongation of Life, supra note 86, at 395-96; see Declaration on Euthanasia,
supra note 86, at 295. One Catholic theologian, in summarizing his view of the contempo-
rary Catholic position, proposed that it is morally acceptable to withhold or withdraw artifi-
cial life-sustaining means when "in the patient's view, this intervention becomes physically,
psychologically, economically, emotionally, or spiritually too difficult to bear [i.e., burden-
some], either for the patient or others." McCartney, supra note 86, at 40 (emphasis added).
Hence, a patient-oriented policy should not disregard the burdens befalling others, espe-
cially where the patient is permanently unconscious and probably unaware of temporal bur-
dens, "but neither can it pretend that the patient himself is not also a center of value and a
finality in the moral order." Meilaender, supra note 90, at 138. Thus, it is suggested that
when surrogate decision-makers assess the benefits and burdens on the patient's behalf, the
assessment should be guided primarily by the patient's values and beliefs.
91 See Paris, supra note 93, at 32; Paris & Varga, supra note 43, at 143. Father Kelly noted
that a similar analysis had been espoused by an earlier theologian who viewed means as
readily obtainable as food and water as nonobligatory if in the circumstances their use
would be futile in prolonging life. See Kelly, supra note 88, at 208; see also Bayer, supra
note 4, at 92 (moralists have long recognized that condemned man on death row need not
eat "last meal" because food will not substantially prolong life).
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C. The Morality of Withholding or Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition
and Hydration
There is presently a conflict among Catholic authorities and theolo-
gians over the morality of allowing a patient to forego artificial nutrition
and hydration." The following discussion will present and analyze con-
" See Paris & McCormick, The Catholic Tradition on the Use of Nutrition and Fluids,
156 AM. 356, 361 (1987). Fathers John J. Paris, S.J., and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., have
contended that neither traditional nor contemporary Catholic moral theology calls for a dis-
tinction based on the means sought to be withheld or withdrawn; they believe that it is
moral to withhold food and water, artificial or otherwise, when appropriate under a utility
and proportionality analysis. See id. at 358; see also Bayer, supra note 4, at 97 (society must
allow withdrawal of food and water when useless to substantially prolong life or when exces-
sively burdensome); Lynn & Childress, supra note 41, at 18-19 (artificial nutrition and hy-
dration should be foregone if excessively burdensome, futile, or of no benefit); McCartney,
supra note 86, at 40 (Catholic teaching not opposed to withholding artificial sustenance if
burdensome, and uselessness should be factor in determining burdensomeness); O'Rourke,
supra note 70, at 322 (can withhold or withdraw tube feeding "[i]f efforts to prolong life are
useless or result in a severe burden for the patient" in his pursuit of purpose of life); Walter,
supra note 87, at 619 (no moral distinction between refusal or withdrawal of nutrients and
other medical technologies such as respirator). In addition, neither the Vatican nor the U.S.
Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities condemns the morality of withholding or with-
drawing artificial nourishment under all circumstances. See Declaration on Euthanasia,
supra note 86, at 294-95 (drawing no distinction as to type of treatment, but rather, relying
on determination of benefits and burdens); U.S. Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities,
supra note 28, at 224 (artificial nourishment may become "too ineffective or burdensome to
be obligatory;" nevertheless, there should be presumption favoring its use).
On the other hand, the New Jersey Catholic Conference has maintained that "nutrition
and hydration, which are basic to human life, and as such distinguished from medical treat-
ment, should always be provided to a patient. Withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in-
troduces a new attack upon human life." Amicus Brief, supra note 85, at 2-3; see also Pon-
tifical Academy of Sciences, The Artificial Prolongation of Life, in 15 ORIGINS 415, 415
(1985). Under the auspices of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, a group of doctors and
scientists reported to Pope John Paul II that, although medical intervention may not be
required for a permanently unconscious patient or any patient for whom treatment is of no
benefit, "all care should be lavished on him, including feeding." Id. (emphasis added); see
also Barry, supra note 70, at 100-01 (1986). Father Robert Barry, O.P., maintains that artifi-
cial means of nutrition and hydration, except hyperalimentation, are not medical treat-
ments, because they are consistent with normal basic care providing "natural extrinsic re-
sources of the body" that do not "[d]irectly, proximately, and immediately" cure
pathological conditions. Id.; see Meilaender, supra note 69, at 11-12 (nourishment is not a
cure in itself, but care that humans owe one another to sustain life); see also Derr, Why
Food and Fluids Can Never Be Denied, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 28-30 (1986) ("six
mutually reinforcing . . . considerations" distinguish food and fluids from medical treat-
ment). Father Barry contends that intravenous, nasogastric, or stomach tube feeding should
be implemented whenever it can sustain life and is medically possible to implement, and
rejects the proposition that these means could be excessively burdensome or that their fi-
nancial burden could justify withdrawal. See Barry, supra note 70, at 103-04; see also Ami-
cus Brief, supra note 85, at 5 (provision of nutrition and hydration is not excessively bur-
densome and should always be provided).
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temporary Catholic moral theology regarding the withholding or with-
drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from terminally ill and perma-
nently unconscious patients.
In regard to permanently unconscious patients, an analysis of the
utility of providing artificial nutrition and hydration to prolong life raises
an insoluble philosophic dilemma. If it is assumed, arguendo, that the
permanently unconscious patient is not a "dying patient," is feeding the
patient useful simply because it prolongs the life (or existence) of the pa-
tient? According to the U.S. Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities,
nutrition and hydration are not useless when they can sustain the pa-
tient's life regardless of the patient's condition. 7 Similarly, the New
Jersey Catholic Conference has asserted that "there is no dispute that
nutrition and hydration are beneficial because they would preserve the
permanently unconscious patient's life." s Gilbert Meilaender, Professor
of Religion, Oberlin College, has suggested that, notwithstanding the fact
that artificial feeding is not implemented primarily to cure or to retrieve
the cognitive capabilities of the now insensate patient, such treatment is
useful because it constitutes needed care that ought not be foregone."
Conversely, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research has de-
termined that providing nutrition and hydration to a permanently uncon-
scious patient is essentially useless, except to the extent that sustaining
the body permits the remotest chance of recovery. 0 0 According to one
Catholic ethicist, Father Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., providing artificial nutri-
tion and hydration is useless if it is unable to restore "cognitive-effective
function" to the permanently unconscious patient."0 ' Father O'Rourke's
conclusion was premised on the proposition that physiological existence
without cognitive capacity negates the patient's attainment of the pur-
poses of life.10 2
See U.S. Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities, supra note 28, at 223.
8' See Amicus Brief, supra note 85, at 8.
" See Meilaender, supra note 69, at 12-13; Meilaender, supra note 90, at 139; see also
Barry, supra note 70, at 105 (artificial feeding is useful in sustaining "natural organic opera-
tions and defenses" even if not principally aimed at improving neurological functions); Con-
nery, supra note 86, at 90, 95 (not useless if it prolongs life perceptibly, and human life is
present at least until brain death).
100 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 190.
101 See O'Rourke, supra note 70, at 322.
102 See id.; see also Bayer, supra note 4, at 92-93 (permanently unconscious patient has lost
that capacity which identifies one as human being: the capacity for human intercommunica-
tion); Lynn & Childress, supra note 41, at 18 (food and water are useless to patient who will
never be able to experience events occurring in world or in his own body). But see Barry,
supra note 70, at 105 (food and water should not be considered useless if they can sustain
life); Meilaender, supra note 69, at 12 (not useless if it preserves bodily life, even if it does
not restore cognitive capacity).
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What about the usefulness of providing artificial nutrition and hy-
dration to a patient who is literally "dying"-the terminally ill patient?
In discussing the morality of withholding artificial feeding from a termi-
nally ill patient, Father Kelly posed a hypothetical involving a conscious,
terminally ill patient in excruciating pain whose life could be prolonged
several weeks with intravenous feeding. 0 3 Father Kelly responded that, in
theory, the patient's relatives should be able to refuse the feeding because
it would be useless under the circumstances.'" Father Joseph V. Sullivan,
addressing an almost identical scenario (a terminally ill cancer patient
suffering extreme pain), upheld a physician's choice to withdraw intrave-
nous feeding, deeming it nonobligatory because of the patient's condi-
tion. '0 Doctors Joanne Lynn, M.D., former Assistant Director of the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and James F. Childress, Ph.D.,
Professor of Religious Studies and Medical Education, University of Vir-
ginia, in their highly authoritative and persuasive article, discussed hypo-
thetical situations involving a variety of terminally ill patients to illus-
trate the futility of providing food and water under some
circumstances."' Most significantly, the Vatican explicitly addressed the
plight of the terminally ill in its Declaration on Euthanasia, and clearly
counselled the morality of foregoing those treatments incapable of
preventing death and only yielding a "precarious and painful prolonga-
tion of life."'' 0 It is submitted that the Vatican had no intention of ex-
cluding artificial nutrition and hydration from the myriad of life-sus-
taining treatments that could properly be withheld or withdrawn from
113 Kelly, supra note 88, at 218-19.
' See id. at 219. However, Father Kelly declined to give a definitive response because he
feared that withholding feeding under such circumstances would be perceived as a form of
"Catholic euthanasia." See id. His fear was based on his position that the intravenous feed-
ing should be considered "ordinary," but nevertheless optional, because it was useless under
the circumstances; that position may have been unacceptable to his contemporaries, since
the distinction between omitting an "ordinary" means as opposed to a "useless ordinary"
means may not have been appreciated. Id. Fathers Paris and McCormick have suggested
that Father Kelly's reluctance to counsel physicians that withholding intravenous feeding
can be morally permissible may have given impetus to the view of some moralists that feed-
ing must always be provided. See Paris & McCormick, supra note 96, at 360. It is notewor-
thy, however, that Father Kelly later altered his position when he explained that the use-
lessness of a given means indicates it is "extraordinary" and, hence, clearly optional. See
Kelly, supra note 91, at 550.
10 See McCartney, supra note 86, at 38 (quoting J. SULLIVAN, CATHOLIC TEACHING ON THE
MORALITY OF EUTHANASIA 73 (1949)).
'" See Lynn & Childress, supra note 41, at 18. The authors explained that such futile ef-
forts may in fact cause further suffering without countervailing benefits. Id.
107 See Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 295.
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terminally ill patients.0 8
Deciding whether feeding the terminally ill and permanently uncon-
scious is useful or useless is actually subsumed within the analysis of the
proportionality of benefits and burdens. 09 If the physician's conclusion
that the patient has no hope of recovery and the determination that a
permanently unconscious patient can no longer derive any benefit from
feeding are accepted, 1 then the feeding should be considered futile and
the burdens disproportionate to the benefits; thus, the artificial feeding
would be deemed morally nonobligatory under Catholic precepts."1 With
respect to terminally ill patients who are incapable of deciding their
course of treatment and who will soon die regardless of any medical inter-
ventions, efforts to nourish will, to a great extent, be futile; therefore, the
morality of foregoing nourishment should stem from an appraisal of the
patient's comfort needs in terms of benefits and burdens." 2 Feeding
could then be foregone if excessively burdensome at this stage in the dy-
ing process.
The New Jersey Catholic Conference has maintained that providing
108 See Address by Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Archbishop of Chicago and Chairman of the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities, at the Univer-
sity of Chicago's Center for Clinical Medical Ethics (May 26, 1988) [hereinafter Address by
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin] ("We also may not develop a policy to keep alive those who...
are terminally ill, or to preclude a decision ... that the artificial provision of nutrition and
hydration has become useless or unduly burdensome."). The Vatican, however, did express
the caveat that "ordinary treatment that is due to the sick in such cases may not be inter-
rupted." Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 295. It is submitted that the Vatican
was referring to comfort care, both spiritual and physical, necessary to ease the dying pro-
cess. See O'Rourke, supra note 70, at 323; see also UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT
§ 6(b) (Proposed Official Draft by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 1985) (Act does not affect physician's obligation to provide nutrition and hydra-
tion for comfort care or relief of pain); Cranford, Patients With Permanent Loss of Con-
sciousness, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 186, 188 (J. Lynn ed. 1986) (overriding objec-
tive is not to prolong life, but to maintain comfort, hygiene, and dignity); Lynn & Childress,
supra note 41, at 19 (food and fluids may be warranted as palliative care). A group of ten
physicians, co-authors of a highly publicized article, went further, and concluded that if
"severely and irreversibly demented" patients (not necessarily terminally ill) refuse oral nu-
trition, artificial nutrition and hydration may then be withheld: the only care necessary
would be that needed to make them comfortable. See Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford,
Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig & Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility
Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955, 959 (1984). The justification for
withholding feeding to this type of patient is not, however, that it is useless, but that it may
be excessively burdensome. See Meilaender, supra note 69, at 13.
109 See McCartney, supra note 86, at 40.
10 See Lynn & Childress, supra note 41, at 18; supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
.. See Statement by Bishop Louis Gelineau, Diocese of Providence, R.I., On Removing Nu-
trition and Water from a Comatose Woman, reprinted in 17 ORIGINS 545, 547 (1988) (quot-
ing opinion of Father Robert McManus, Vicar for Education, Diocese of Providence, R.I.).
1.. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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nutrition and hydration is never excessively burdensome and, therefore,
always obligatory. " ' However, this view is contested in contemporary
Catholic moral theology.1 " Three issues have contributed to this disa-
greement. First, should an assessment of burdens be limited to the bur-
dens of the treatment itself or include the burdens of the life sustained?
Second, is the burden to others-other than the patient-relevant?
Third, is the economic burden a relevant consideration?.. 6
The burdens of the artificial feeding itself, the actual intrusion and
risk incident to the initial implementation and continuing provision, are
obvious considerations." 6 However, it has been argued that to limit an
assessment of burdens to the treatment itself would foreclose a determi-
nation of the burdens of the life sustained, that is, the patient's "quality
of life" with the treatment." 7 It has been further argued that in deter-
mining the patient's "quality of life," the quality of the patient's life
should be discerned from the patient's point of view and not from an-
other's point of view as to what is an appropriate quality of life for that
patient." Father James McCartney, O.S.A., has stated that Catholic
"'3 See Amicus Brief, supra note 85, at 5; see also Barry, supra note 70, at 104-05 (intrave-
nous, nasogastric, and stomach tube feeding are not excessively burdensome in the long
term).
114 See Paris & McCormick, supra note 96, at 360.
11 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 85 n.123.
.1. See Lo & Dornbrand, supra note 41, at 403; Lynn & Childress, supra note 41, at 18;
Major, supra note 3, at 24-27.
Walter, supra note 87, at 618-19; see O'Rourke, supra note 70, at 323.
118 See, e.g., Walter, supra note 87, at 619. James Walter, Associate Professor of Theology,
Loyola University, Chicago, observed that if Catholic ethicists recognize that "'quality of
life' stands for a certain norm or criterion which states that a person's life is not worth
anything unless that life is able to function at an arbitrary level" then the judgment is
indeed improper. Id. That sentiment was the essence of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
refusal to allow a determination of a patient's "best interests" based upon the "'social util-
ity' . . . or the value of that life to others." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 367, 486 A.2d 1209,
1232-33 (1985). Professor Walter explained that a "quality of life" determination can be
interpreted in such a way as to reflect an inquiry into the " 'quality' of a person's life as it
affects his or her ability to pursue and attain values beyond biological existence." Walter,
supra note 87, at 619; see also O'Rourke, supra note 70, at 323 (relevant burden for termi-
nally ill is "the burden that a person would experience in striving for the purpose of life, not
the burden associated with the means to prolong life"). But see Connery, supra note 86, at
92-94. Father John Connery, S.J., S.T.D., does not believe it is possible to delineate a mor-
ally acceptable "quality of life" criterion once one attempts to pass the confines of a quality
of treatment assessment. See id. at 94; Derr, supra note 41, at 36-37 (one must not judge as
to burdensomeness of patients' lives). Father Connery's conclusion is premised on the belief
that allowing judgments as to the quality of patients' lives puts society "at the edge of the
slippery slope toward euthanasia." Walter, supra note 87, at 616. The U.S. Bishops' Com-
mittee for Pro-Life Activities has urged for legallyestablished safeguards to protect uncon-
scious and otherwise disabled patients from adverse judgments concerning their quality of
life. See U.S. Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities, supra note 28, at 224.
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teaching recognizes the propriety of assessing burdensomeness from the
patient's perspective "in terms of the physical, economic, psychological,
or spiritual factors involved.""' 9 Regarding the burden to others, Papal
pronouncements clearly espouse the propriety of considering the burden
to others when determining whether excessive burdens render the treat-
ment nonobligatory. 2 0 The Vatican's Declaration on Euthanasia explic-
itly recognized that a "heavy burden on the family or community" indi-
cates the treatment might be excessively burdensome.' 2 ' As to the third
controversial issue, the relevancy of economic burdens, significant author-
ity indicates that economic costs are pertinent and proper considerations
in the assessment of burdens.'22
In several respects, a resolution of the conflict in contemporary Cath-
olic theology on the morality of withholding or withdrawing artificial nu-
trition and hydration under certain circumstances from patients incapa-
ble of making health care decisions should lend significant authoritative
guidance to courts, health care providers, and health care decision-mak-
ers. First, courts have recognized the value of the evidence of a patient's
religious beliefs and the tenets of that religion which, if clear, may signifi-
cantly aid the decision-maker in discerning the now incompetent pa-
tient's desires regarding life-sustaining treatment. " In turn, if the pa-
tient's desires are sufficiently known they will be paramount in directing
the course of treatment. Second, Catholic related health facilities, guided
by the precepts of the Catholic Church, could unhesitantly fulfill their
role of conscientiously serving the health care needs and desires of termi-
nally ill and permanently unconscious patients, while faithfully adhering
to Catholic moral precepts. 4 Catholic-related health facilities would
have little need to resort to the courts when resolving requests to with-
"0 McCartney, supra note 86, at 40.
20 See Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 295; The Prolongation of Life, supra
note 86, at 395-96.
... See Declaration on Euthanasia, supra note 86, at 295; see also The Prolongation of
Life, supra note 86, at 395-96 (nonobligatory if grave burden to oneself or another); Con-
nery, supra note 86, at 91 (patient may be even more concerned about burdens to family
than to self); McCartney, supra note 86, at 40 (consider physical, psychological, economic,
emotional, and spiritual burdens either for patient or others).
122 See Address by Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, supra note 108; see also McCartney, supra
note 86, at 40 (economic burden to patient or others from patient's view is relevant); Mc-
Cormick, supra note 87, at 174-75 (treatment is nonobligatory if crushing financial costs
would cause great hardship for oneself or one's family); O'Rourke, supra note 70, at 323
(great expense may interfere with one's striving for purposes of life and render means non-
obligatory). But see Barry, supra note 70, at 104 (financial costs do not justify withdrawing
nourishment).
"' See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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hold or withdraw artificial feeding. 125 Third, when courts are faced with
articulating the relevant factors to be considered in weighing the benefits
and burdens involved in withholding or withdrawing artificial nourish-
ment, Catholic teaching could persuade the courts that, contrary to the
New Jersey Supreme Court's focus on pain as the dispositive criterion for
deciding the best interests of a terminally ill patient, an analysis of the
relevant burdens entails a broader assessment.1 21
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent case law has significantly bolstered judicial acceptance of a
patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration by finding these
measures indistinguishable from other forms of life-sustaining medical
treatment such as a respirator. 127 If courts would uniformly accept or re-
ject the proposition that artificial nutrition and hydration may be fore-
gone, they could engage in the resolution of other significant issues, in-
cluding the establishment of safeguards in the health care decision-
making process where legislative efforts do not exist.
A Vatican pronouncement of the Catholic Church's position on the
morality of withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration
under certain circumstances would eliminate the confusion now troubling
Catholic authorities and theologians and, simultaneously, would lend
guidance to health care providers and decision-makers within and with-
out the Catholic community.'2" Additionally, clarification of the Church's
'25 See In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 213 N.J. Super.
443, 517 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986) (Catholic affiliated hospital sought court authorization to
transfer competent, terminally ill elderly patient who anticipatorily refused artificial feed-
ing; hospital asserted its policy against complying with such refusals, but court denied
request).
128 McCartney, supra note 86, at 40; see supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 382, 529 A.2d 419, 428 (1987) (no distinction between
withholding or withdrawing artificial feeding devices and other forms of life-sustaining
treatment) (reaffirming conclusion drawn in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-74, 486 A.2d
1209, 1236 (1985)); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 App. Div. 2d 1, 19, 516
N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 (2d Dep't 1987) (same); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
128 An attorney associated with the landmark case, In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), and the recent case, In re Jobes, 108 N.J..394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987), has challenged the National Conference of Catholic Bishops:
to make plain, not only to Catholics but also to the American public, what are the
medical options for treatment and non-treatment at the end of life which are morally
available according to the teachings of the church .... [This attorney] believe[s] it
does an immeasurable disservice to possess possibly the richest body of teaching in
this area and refuse, of design, to share it forthrightly with a society sorely in need of
authoritative guidance, directly in the medical-ethical arena, indirectly in the arena
of public policy.
Hill, Defining Sacred Bonds: A Lawyer Looks At Church, Law, & Medical Policy, 113 CoM-
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position should further the efforts of surrogate decision-makers (whether
the courts or private parties) when they attempt to discern the previously
expressed desires of patients who are now incapable of making health
care decisions, especially where the patient's closely held religious beliefs
are those espoused by the Catholic Church."2 9
MONWEAL 620, 621 (1986) (interview with Paul W. Armstrong, Attorney, New Jersey).
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
